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Abstract
Background: A vast body of social and cognitive psychology studies in humans reports evidence that external rewards,
typically monetary ones, undermine intrinsic motivation. These findings challenge the standard selfish-rationality
assumption at the core of economic reasoning. In the present work we aimed at investigating whether the different
modulation of a given monetary reward automatically and unconsciously affects effort and performance of participants
involved in a game devoid of visual and verbal interaction and without any perspective-taking activity.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Twelve pairs of participants were submitted to a simple motor coordination game while
recording the electromyographic activity of First Dorsal Interosseus (FDI), the muscle mainly involved in the task. EMG data
show a clear effect of alternative rewards strategies on subjects’ motor behavior. Moreover, participants’ stock of relevant
past social experiences, measured by a specifically designed questionnaire, was significantly correlated with EMG activity,
showing that only low social capital subjects responded to monetary incentives consistently with a standard rationality
prediction.
Conclusions/Significance: Our findings show that the effect of extrinsic motivations on performance may arise outside
social contexts involving complex cognitive processes due to conscious perspective-taking activity. More importantly, the
peculiar performance of low social capital individuals, in agreement with standard economic reasoning, adds to the
knowledge of the circumstances that makes the crowding out/in of intrinsic motivation likely to occur. This may help in
improving the prediction and accuracy of economic models and reconcile this puzzling effect of external incentives with
economic theory.
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Introduction
The assumption of Homo Oeconomicus at the basis of economic
reasoning entails the prediction that individuals should respond to
incentives, altering costs and benefits associated to available
choices, in an manner consistent with a self-regarding behavior.
Since the early 70’s , however, a large body of empirical research
undertaken by social and cognitive psychologists shows that in
many social contexts external rewards, typically monetary ones,
affect behavior in a direction opposite to that predicted by a
standard selfish-rationality argument. This evidence strongly
supports the view that external motivations often undermine intrinsic
motivations, which per se sustain effort and performance, resulting
ineffective or even counterproductive. This phenomenon has been
termed ‘‘The Hidden Cost of Reward’’ [1], ‘‘Corruption Effect’’
[2] and, more recently, ‘‘Cognitive Evaluation Theory’’ [3] or
‘‘Motivation Crowding Theory’’ [4].
This evidence has been largely neglected by economists.
However, starting from the late Nineties, a growing number of
empirical studies have coped with this puzzling phenomenon. This
body of research substantially confirms the relevance of the
Motivation Crowding Effect (MCE), both from laboratory
experiments [5,6] and field research [7–9].
Prompted by these empirical results, several studies have
attempted to reconcile economic and psychological views,
developing formal models that clarify the conditions under which
the MCE may arise. This body of research extends and refines
along two directions a basic strategic setting, in which contractual
relationships are vitiated by potential conflict of interests arising
from asymmetric information. Typically, this class of games
consider a principal that contracts another party (agent) to
perform some action; since the action is costly to the agent and
his decision is costly to observe the agreement gives the agent the
incentive to defects. The first approach [10,11] considers an
agency game with bilateral asymmetric information in which both
the principal and the agent do not know something known by the
other party which is relevant to their decision. For example, an
employee (the principal) may know better than the worker (the
agent) the toil and trouble required by the task; in this case the
agent may infer from an explicit reward an excessive weariness,
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thus weakening his/her intrinsic motivation. If the reward is
viewed as a strategic device that conveys information on some
hidden, unpleasant, feature of the task the external incentive
offered by the principal to the agent may reduce agent’s effort and
performance. The second approach assumes that the change in
behaviour due to an external intervention does not reflect a
change in the information set of the agent, but is attributed to a
change in preference [12,13]. Under this perspective, intrinsic
motivation is modelled as an additional argument within a
standard specification of agent’s utility function. Since intrinsic
motivation is assumed to adversely responds to explicit monetary
reward, the resulting welfare loss may cause a lower effort and
cooperation on the part of the agent.
Despite the different interpretations at the basis of the MCE,
these two approaches share the implicit view that there is no room
for intrinsic motivation to be a relevant aspect of observed
behavior outside a strategic context. From this arise two important
issues. On the one side this approach may determine the
misleading view that the relevance of intrinsic motivations is
restricted to a specific range of social situations. Actually, as
pointed out by Aristotle more than 2,300 years ago, ‘‘man is by
nature a social animal’’, which, translated into the language of
modern social sciences, exactly means that individuals are
intrinsically motivated to social relations. It follows that whatever
social interaction may be sustained by a motivation, related to the
value of social interaction by itself, and distinct from the explicit
goal that actually prompts the behaviour. Not only this implies
that the bias of external rewards may arise in social situations not
involving explicit perspective-taking activity, but also that outside
explicit social contexts the role of motivations, and their potential
conflict with external incentives, shouldn’t arise as a relevant
phenomenon. On the other side, the MCE should necessarily be
the consequence of cognitively controlled processes undertaken by
the agent. This issue has never been of any empirical concern by
the above literature. It follows that it remains unclear, whether the
implicit assumption that the MCE results from a conscious mental
process is grounded on some kind of evidence or whether it is the
consequence of the effort to formalize the MCE within a
theoretical framework that retains the basic assumption of
rationality.
Actually, we think that this question has never been considered by
the above literature, mainly as a consequence of the scarce
interaction between research undertaken within different social
science fields. Indeed, a vast body of research in social psychology
has demonstrated the importance of uncontrolled processes in
shaping individuals’ behavior [14–16] and, more recently, the
debate has focused on the importance of motivation in unconscious
processes [17–21]. However, this body of research is mainly
concerned with the effectiveness and appropriateness of action in
response to automatic evaluation, mainly to show how the
unconscious provides individuals with effortless decision devices
able to effectively purse a given goal both in individual contexts
[22,23] and in social contexts [24,25]. On the contrary, our
interdisciplinary perspective motivates a slightly different design, in
the sense that we investigated under what conditions changes in
external incentives may interact with social motivations to
determine different patterns of behaviour, outcomes of an
unconscious processing.
With regards to these considerations, the focus of our
experiment was to verify whether different ways to distribute a
given amount of money, affects effort and cooperation within a
context where interaction between individuals does not involve
any explicit process related to emotional cues and/or to strategic
or ‘‘perspective-taking’’ considerations. Furthermore, since we
wanted to investigate if different rewarding schemes influence
behavior at a very low level, we avoid external incentives strictly
contingent on performance by modulating a fixed amount of
money within different experimental conditions, and focusing the
attention on behavior variations revealed through activity changes
in the muscle mainly involved during the execution of a motor
task. To this purpose, twelve pairs of participants, prevented from
any visual or verbal exchange, were submitted to a simple motor
coordination task. Each couple had to cooperatively hold a small
sphere between their right index fingers and to drop it alternately
into one of two containers placed below their hands, while
electromyography of the right first dorsal interosseus (FDI) muscle of
each participant was recorded. Each successful trial was differently
rewarded with a given amount of money according to the
experimental condition, and the rewarding rules were communi-
cated before starting each session. Consequently, for the same
action (e.g., pushing the sphere into the left-side container) each
participant could receive a reward in one session but not in
another. The total monetary reward gained by each subject in
each condition was always the same. Finally, we correlated muscle
involvement with the scores obtained in a social attitude
questionnaire to verify if the stock of social capital covertly
modulates motor behavior.
Methods
Subjects
Twenty-four female participants were recruited among students
of the Law Department of the University of Ferrara (mean age
26+/23). All of them were naı¨ve to the purpose of the experiment,
were right-handed according to the Oldfield questionnaire [26]
and gave their informed consent. They were divided into two
subgroups (the ‘‘Green’’ and the ‘‘Yellow’’ group) of 12
participants, and kept in separate rooms after their arrival at the
lab. Twelve pairs of subjects were then formed by extracting
randomly one partner from each subgroup. Each pair, composed
by one Green and one Yellow subject, was submitted to an
experimental session lasting approximately 30 minutes.
Questionnaire
In the first stage of the experiment the subjects were asked to
answer a written questionnaire based on the Social Capital
Community Benchmark Survey (SCCBS) [27].
Following the SCCBS we employed the answers provided by
subjects to build several indexes aimed at measuring individual
stock of social capital (see Appendix S2 for details).
Coordination game
Before entering the lab room, subjects have been invited to
remove rings, bracelets, nail enamel, or other kind of decoration,
that could have made them recognizable by the other subjects. At
the beginning of the experiment, two subjects entered the
experimental room from two different doors, standing one in
front of the other, their face and trunk hidden by a curtain. Thus,
during the experimental session subjects never saw each other.
Moreover, they were strictly recommended not to speak to exclude
any possible recognition based on subject’s voice.
Subjects were requested to pose their forearms on a Plexiglas
surface with a square hole in correspondence of their hands.
Twenty centimeters below the Plexiglas was set an apparatus
constituted by two adjacent containers of equal size, with the
partition side aligned with participants’ sagittal plane. At the
beginning of each trial a small glass sphere (1 cm diameter) was
placed between the extended right index fingers of the two
EMG and Social Capital in Coordination Games
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subjects, and subjects were requested to stay on this position
(starting position) until the go-signal. In this position the sphere
was exactly above the border between the two containers placed
20 centimeters below subjects’ hands. Subjects’ index fingers were
dressed with a soft sponge to avoid finger flexion during the game,
and to increase the attrition surface to better keep the sphere in the
proper position.
Each pair of subjects was asked to play 30 trials of a simple
motor ability game. The 30 trials were subdivided into three
experimental conditions (C1, C2 and C3) of ten trials each, blocked
into three experimental sessions, the presentation of which was
pseudo-randomly balanced across pairs. At every trial subjects
followed the instruction given by the experimenter indicating to
drop the sphere alternately into the two containers. The difference
among conditions C1, C2 and C3. consisted in the monetary
incentive associated to each trial successfully performed by
subjects. Specifically, in C1, putting the sphere into either target
container yielded a reward of J 0.50 to each subject (Figure 1). In
C2 and C3, two colored sheets, one green and one yellow, were
placed onto the floor of each container, defining the Green and the
Yellow container. The allocation of rewards coupled containers
and subjects of the same color. When the sphere was successfully
dropped into the target container a J 1 reward was received by
the correspondent colored subject only. In C2, the Green (Yellow)
container was placed at the left side of the Green (Yellow) subject:
the winning subject had to execute an index finger abduction
(contraction of the FDI muscle) to push the sphere towards the
container (Figure 1B). In C3, the colors of containers were
reversed, so that the Green (Yellow) container was placed at the
right side of the Green (Yellow) subject: the winning subject had to
execute an index finger adduction (FDI muscle not involved) to
‘‘pull’’ the sphere towards the container (Figure 1C). The total
money reward gained by each subject was J 5 in each condition
(J 15 total).
EMG Recordings
Electromyographic potentials (EMG) were recorded from right
first dorsal interosseus (FDI) muscle by using Ag-AgCl surface
electrodes (diameter 6 mm) glued to the subjects’ skin according
to a tendon-belly configuration. After online rectification and
integration (time constant 50 ms) EMG signal was continuously
recorded during the experiment and fed to a personal computer
for the successive analysis. A custom-made software acquired the
two filtered EMG at 25 Hz, a frequency fast enough to correctly
sample the integrated - i.e. smoothed - signals. The instant at
which the ball touched the bottom of the target container was
Figure 1. The experimental apparatus used in the three experimental conditions. Subjects’ hands laid on a Plexiglas plate (see D) with the
two index fingers positioned in correspondence of a square hole (the rectangle shown in the figure). Under the Plexiglas plate, at a distance of 10 cm
from it, there were two containers (the two grey areas shown in panel A) where the subjects had to drop the sphere held by their index fingers
according to the specific instructions provided for each experimental conditions. The moment at which the sphere touched the floor of the container
was detected by a load cell. The monetary incentives associated to the three experimental conditions were the following: Condition 1 (A): each
subject (Yellow and Green) get J 0.50 at any trial. Condition 2: the Yellow (Green) subject is coupled with the Yellow (Green) container; the pushing
subject gets J 1 while the pulling one gets zero. Condition 3: the container are reversed; the pushing subject gets zero and the pulling one gets J 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017372.g001
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detected by means of a load cell supporting the container itself.
The signal from the load cell, appropriately amplified, was
continuously acquired during the experiment by the same
acquisition software used for EMG recordings and at the same
sampling frequency.
Data Analysis: ANOVA
For each trial, ten EMG samples, acquired from the pushing
subject and concerning the 400 ms before the fall of the sphere
into the container, were averaged and considered for the analysis.
The averaged data from each subject, acquired during the three
experimental conditions, were then normalized (z-score) and
submitted to a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). The
considered factor was Experimental Condition, a three levels,
within-subjects, factor. Post-hoc analysis (Newman-Keuls, p,0.05)
was then performed to verify the significant differences between
individual conditions.
Data Analysis: Regression Model
Our data set is distributed along four relevant dimensions: time,
trials, subjects and conditions. In particular, since each trial has a
different number of observations (i.e a different time length), to
perform a regression analysis we had to balance our panel data set.
To this purpose, we synchronized all trials with respect to the
EMG peak of the pushing subject (i.e the instant at which the
sphere was released, starting to drop into the container) and kept
12 observations before this point in time. This allowed us to
construct a balanced panel data set of a total of 4,320 observations.
The potential information of our multi dimensional stock of
data is not fully exploited by standard analysis of variance, since
ANOVA does not control for many potential sources of variability,
such as the muscle effort exerted by subject’s couplemate, or
individual fixed effects. Therefore, we considered the following
dynamic multiple regression model:
EMGit~a0za1EMGit{2za2EMGit{5za3EMGjt{2z
a4EMGjt{5zb2C2zb3C3zcitXitzgizeit,
The dependent variable EMGit is subject i’s EMG signal at time t,
when involved in pushing the sphere towards the target container.
The right-hand side of the equation models the set of explanatory
variables. Specifically, EMGit{n is the lagged EMG of subject i
and EMGjt{n (n= 2,5) is the lagged EMG of subject j (couplemate
of subject i). Lags have been set at 2 and 5 time periods (n = 2, 5).
This accounts for a period of time ranging from 80 ms (2 * 40 ms,
being the sampling frequency 25 Hz) to 200 ms (5 * 40 ms). This
choice was based on the observation that when a perturbation is
applied during a precision grip a latency of 60–80 ms is required
to increase the grip force to restore an adequate safety margin,
preventing frictional slips [28]. Thus, we defined this time range in
order to include the minimal reaction time to a change in the load
force applied by subject j, plus a possible delay determined by the
fact that the grasping requires a coordination between two subjects
and not only between two fingers of the same hand. To perform
successfully the task it is required a continuous exchange of
information between subjects, by the pressure exerted by their
index fingers. The EMGit{n variables reflect the intention of
subject i to push the sphere into the target container. At the same
time, since the task requires the collaboration of subject j, the
lagged EMGjt{n take into account that subject i’s effort depends
on the opposition force exerted by subject’s j finger. Thus, the
dynamic part of the regression model represents the motor
communication between subjects i and j. Other factors that might
have influenced the motor behavior of subjects could have been
determined by strain or stress and learning-by-doing. To account
for these factors, we introduced in vector Xit the time length of
trials and the sequence order of trials over the entire experiment.
The reason of our choice is that lengthy trials may have been more
expensive in terms of attention, thus affecting the effort spent by
subjects. Furthermore, subjects’ effort might have been differently
modulated over the course of the experiment, due to a better
knowledge of her couplemate and/or to the improvement in their
motor ability. Several non observable characters of subjects (such
that religion, education, family conditions etc..) may influence the
dependent variable. The term gi represents a vector of individual
dummies, that control the regression model for this individuals’
heterogeneity. Finally, C2 and C3 are two dummies for condition 2
and 3 respectively, controlling for experimental conditions
instructions.
Results
Behavior and Electromyography
As shown in Table 1 subjects were able to coordinate almost
perfectly in all three experimental conditions, with only a
negligible proportion of inefficient outcomes (2.7% of total
observations), uniformly distributed across conditions.
Figure 2 depicts the typical EMG traces recorded from both
subjects’ FDI muscles (blue and red traces) and the signal recorded
from the load cell, detecting the instant at which the sphere, after
its releasing, touches the floor of the container (black trace), during
condition 1 (A) and 3 (B).
As it appears from Figure 2, at the beginning of each trial there
is an increase of both subjects’ EMG determined by the
involvement of subjects’ index fingers in maintaining the glass
sphere in the starting position. After the go-signal (not indicated in
the figure), one of the two subjects starts to exert a phasic effort to
push the sphere into the assigned container, as revealed by a clear
peak, slightly anticipating the load cell signal. While in panel A the
blue and the red peaks clearly alternate, in panel B the trend is less
clear, showing some degree of superimposition of the two traces
during some of the trials. Note that in both conditions the
instructions were exactly the same: ‘‘Place the sphere into the
target container’’. The only difference between the two conditions
concerned the monetary reward. In Condition 1, each member of
the pair was winning at any trial, while in Condition 3, each
member of the pair was winning only when the target container
was the one at her right side, requiring the pulling of the sphere
towards the container requiring an index finger adduction (FDI
muscle not involved).
This qualitative difference between conditions is quantitatively
shown in Figure 3, depicting the average values of FDI muscle
EMG, recorded from each subject while pushing the sphere into
the target container placed at her left side in the three
experimental conditions. EMG data, after normalization, were
averaged subject by subject (N = 24) by pooling the last 12 trials
before the signal of the load cell signaled the fall of the sphere.
ANOVA performed on the normalized data with Experimental
Condition as three levels within-subjects factor (see Figure 2)
showed that Experimental Condition was statistically significant
(F(2,46) = 4.48, p= 0.017). Post-hoc analysis (Newman-Keuls)
revealed that EMG activity of C1 was significantly (p,0.05)
stronger than that of C2 and C3. However, as indicated in Table 1,
the game outcome does not reflect this difference, and subjects,
interviewed at the end of the experiment, never reported the
voluntary use of different strategies in the different conditions.
EMG and Social Capital in Coordination Games
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Questionnaire
One of the aims of the present work was to verify if different
levels of social capital modulates muscle involvement of the
pushing subjects, in response to different monetary incentives
among conditions. Using the questionnaire’s answers, we built up
three indicators (SC1, SC2, SC3) to sort subjects according to their
attitude to coordinate and cooperate for mutual benefit (see
Appendix S2 for details). For each of these indicators subjects have
been divided into two subgroups with respect to the index-related
Table 1. Outcomes of the game for each condition.
Condition Green wins Yellow wins
Inefficient
outcomes
Total (12
pairs610 trials)
1 58 58 4 120
2 59 58 3 120
3 59 58 3 120
Total 176 174 10 360
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017372.t001
Figure 2. Typical first dorsal interosseus electromyographic signal rectified, integrated (time constant, 0.05 s) and intra-subject
normalized (z-scores), as recorded from two subjects (red and blue traces) during the interaction game. Panel A, Condition 1; panel B,
Condition 3. The signal recorded from the load cell is shown in black and indicates the ten times the glass sphere fell into the container, signaling the
end of each trial. The figure depicts ten subsequent trials (sampling frequency, 25 Hz). Abscissas, seconds; ordinates, arbitrary normalization units (see
text).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017372.g002
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median score, defining the high- (H= above median) and the low
(L= below median) Social Capital groups of subjects.
Regression Results
The relevant estimation results are presented in table (2) below.
The first column (POOL) reports the estimation results for the
entire set of subjects (24). The other six columns provide results
relative to each high/low prosocial sub-groups according to
indicators SC1, SC2 and SC3. In particular, HSCz and LSCz
(z = 1, 2, 3) refer to High and Low prosocial individuals,
respectively.
Even with the rich specification of explanatory variables inside
the regression model, all simultaneously engaged to account for
the variability of the effort recorded from the pushing subjects, it
still emerges that on average subjects exerted a lower pushing
effort in condition 3 than in condition 1: only the estimated
coefficient of C3 is negative (20.0244) and 5% significant
(t= 2.44). However, once we distinguish between high social
capital and low social capital subjects, the estimated coefficients of
C3 is negative and significant at a 1% level in the low-prosocial
sub-sample, only. This pattern arises whatever index of social
capital is used. Moreover, the coefficient on the dummy C2 turns
out not significant in all regressions, indicating that no difference
in effort is detected between Condition 1 and Condition 2. Despite
the ANOVA reported that subjects significantly spent a lower
effort in Condition 2 than in Condition1, in the light of Table 2
this result appears spurious. Indeed, the regression tells that the
EMG difference between conditions 1 and 2 does not reflect any
change in external incentives schemes, but more likely the
variability in the other set of explanatory variables.
Looking at the dynamic component of the regression,
coefficients of lagged variables are positive and significant,
suggesting that each couple of subjects successfully tried to
coordinate their index fingers as a pair of agonists. However,
considering the magnitude of coefficients for different groups of
subjects substantial differences emerge between high social capital
(High SC) and low social capital (Low SC) individuals. In
particular, the following two results appear to be relevant (formal
tests are provided in Appendix S1 )
R1) The coefficients of the dynamic part of the regression
(autoregressive component) decrease with farther time lags,
both in the High SC and Low SC groups
R2) Result 3 emerges looking at the coefficients describing
how subjects’ current effort depends on the past effort of her
couplemate. In the High SC group the coefficient at lag (22)
is greater than the corresponding coefficient at lag (25) and
the reverse patterns occurs within the Low SC group.
Moreover, it appears that coefficient at lag (22) is higher in
the High SC group than in the Low SC group, while the
reverse pattern is observed at lag (25).
For both high and low social capital subjects the autoregressive
component of the regression model (the lagged EMGit{n
variables) shows that the current effort EMGit of subject i is
positively linked to her own past efforts, and that the magnitude of
the coefficients decreases the farther-off are the lags (result R1).
This is consistent with Figure 2, which shows that intensity of
muscles effort progressively increases, and reaches its peak at the
instant at which the sphere is dropped.
Result R2 describes how the current reaction of subject i
depends on past motor behavior of subject j. Overall, estimated
coefficients are significantly non negative. However, looking at the
size of coefficients it emerges a striking difference between high
and low social capital individuals. Current muscle effort of high
social capital subjects is influenced mainly by the more recent
behavior of their couplemates, while current effort of low social
capital subjects is better explained by the more distant behavior of
their couplemates. Considering high social capital subjects, the
estimated coefficients on EMGjt{5 are not significantly different
from zero in two of the three regressions (HSC1 and HSC2) and
significant at the 5% level but close to zero in the HSC3 case. On
the contrary, coefficients on EMGjt{2 are positive and significant
in HSC1 and HSC2 and not significant in HSC3. Exactly the
reverse pattern occurs with low social capital subjects: coefficients
on EMGjt{5 are significant at a 1% level, while those on
EMGjt{2 are not significant in all cases (LSC1, LSC2 and LSC3).
This evidence shows that, compared to high social capital subjects,
low social capital participants exhibited a delayed response to
stimuli coming from changes in effort in subject’s opposing finger.
This may suggest that high social capital individuals might have
been prompted by a stronger intrinsic motivation, which resulted
in a more effective motor coordination.
Discussion
An impressive body of social and cognitive psychology studies
reports evidence supporting the view that external rewards,
typically monetary ones, undermine intrinsic motivation (see [3]
and [4] for an extensive survey and meta-analysis). These findings
contradict the behaviour predicted on the basis of the standard
selfish-rationality assumption, which is at the core of economic
reasoning. As a consequence, since the late 90 s an increasing
number of experimental, empirical and theoretical studies have
explored this puzzling issue. This body of research shares the view
that the proper frame in which to consider this phenomenon is a
principal-agent game context (see [4] for a discussion of the major
economic studies identifying crowding effects). This approach
represents a fruitful context to investigate the interaction between
extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. However, it is not the proper
Figure 3. Mean values of EMG signals recorded from the FDI
muscle for all subjects in the three experimental conditions,
when pushing the sphere into the target container placed at
her left side.Whiskers above each histogram depict the standard error
of mean. Ordinates: z-score of EMG signals. Asterisks indicate the
presence of a significant difference between conditions (*, difference
from Condition 1 (C1); **,*** difference from Conditions 2 (C2) and 3
(C3), respectively).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017372.g003
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setting to explore if the side effects of external incentives on
intrinsic motivations might arise as an automatic process, since,
due to the strategic environment, the crowding out/in of intrinsic
motivations necessarily follows from an explicit perspective-taking
activity undertaken by subjects.
In the light of these considerations, we set up an experimental
framework devoid of any complex perspective-taking activity, aimed
at investigating whether the modulation of a given monetary reward
affects effort and performance of participants. Pairs of subjects,
prevented from any visual or verbal interaction, were engaged in a
pure motor coordination game divided into three experimental
conditions, perfectly identical from the point of view of the required
motor task. Moreover, the monetary stake associated to each
condition was exactly the same. Each couple of subjects was asked
to hold a small sphere between their right index fingers and to
alternately drop it into one of two containers placed below their hands,
while electromyography of participants’ right FDI muscle was
recorded. This muscle has the function to abduct the index finger
away from the middle finger. Thus, it is the muscle more involved in
pushing the sphere towards the leftmost container, while it remains
relaxed when the participant is asked to place the sphere into the
rightmost container by exerting a finger adduction. Our aim was to
compare FDI muscle activity when participants were asked to push
the sphere into the leftmost container under different rewarding
schemes. In Condition 1 the completion of each trial entailed an equal
reward assigned to both (pushing and opposing) subjects. In Condition
2 at each trial only the subject who had pushed the sphere towards the
leftmost container obtained the reward. Therefore, in Condition 1 and
Condition 2 FDI muscle involvement in pushing the sphere was
coupled with a monetary reward. On the contrary, in Condition 3 the
reward was assigned to the opposing subject only. Thus, in all trials,
FDI muscle involvement in pushing the sphere was not associated with
any specific monetary reward. It should be stressed that, since the total
monetary reward allocated to both subjects upon completion of the
sequence of trials did not change across conditions, the overall external
motivation, that prompted the motor performance was the same in each
experimental condition. Since subjects were able to coordinate almost
perfectly their movements across conditions 1, 2 and 3, their behavior
is consistent with the conscious perceiving of this external incentive.
Despite from a distributional point of view it does not emerge any
difference in behavior associated with alternative incentive protocols,
substantial differences arise from EMG data processing, revealing that
not only muscle involvement in executing the same motor act is
affected by different allocations of an identical monetary reward, but
also that the modulation of the effort is correlated with the degree of
prosocial propensity of subjects. To measure the social attitude of
participants we used the answers to the questionnaire taken from
Putnam’s Social Capital Benchmark Survey to construct three indexes
of social capital, that we used to split the sample of subjects into high
and low social capital individuals. With respect to these two groups of
individuals our main result is that high-prosocial subjects performed
the task without any significant difference among conditions, while
low-prosocial subjects exerted a significant lower effort in Condition 3
than in Condition 1.
When a small object is gripped between the tips of the index
finger and thumb and held stationary in space, the applied grip
force is synchronically balanced to optimize the motor behaviour.
In addition, the control of the grip force is automatically
influenced by the weight of the object (load force) and by a safety
margin factor related to the individual subject [29,30]. Since this is
fundamental to avoid the accidental drop of the object, within the
context of our experiment, the level of safety margin set by subjects
to avoid errors must be related to the intrinsic motivations that
sustained action toward the desired goal. These considerations
highlight the baseline for discussing our results. Specifically, we
consider that the two index fingers of pair of subjects acted as pairs
of agonists, and that statistically significative changes in effort
detected through the EMG recording relates to the intensity
intrinsic motivations. We assumed that the overall external
motivation was the same in all three experimental conditions,
because each participant received, the same reward in all
conditions and the motor task was performed following the
Table 2. Ordinary Least Squares Regression keeping 12 observations before the maximum EMG level, included.
POOL HSC1 LSC1 HSC2 LSC2 HSC3 LSC3
EMGit{5 0.1121
(4.59)***
0.1439
(4.22)***
0.0838
(2.32)**
0.1840
(5.78)***
0.0567
(1.56)
0.1560
(4.72)***
0.0924
(2.46)**
EMGit{2 0.2898
(12.69)***
0.2918
(8.49)***
0.2634
(8.78)***
0.2634
(7.67)***
0.2724
(8.76)***
0.2294
(6.73)***
0.3233
(10.54)***
EMGjt{5 0.0898
(3.82)***
0.0405
(1.38)
0.1421
(3.79)***
0.0473
(1.64)
0.1552
(4.06)***
0.0615
(2.11)**
0.1196
(3.07)***
EMGjt{2 0.0330
(1.41)
0.1153
(3.61)***
20.0451
(1.38)
0.0748
(2.46)**
20.0073
(0.21)
0.0474
(1.61)
0.0281
(0.75)
C2 20.0041
(0.40)
20.0095
(0.70)
0.0003
(0.02)
20.0098
(0.72)
0.0040
(0.27)
20.0079
(0.59)
0.0015
(0.10)
C3 20.0244
(2.44)**
0.0156
(1.10)
20.0630
(4.49)***
0.0105
(0.73)
20.0535
(3.82)***
20.0093
(0.67)
20.0389
(2.72)***
Constant 0.1044
(4.46)***
0.0867
(2.66)***
0.1322
(0.3.89)***
0.1319
(3.71)***
0.1092
(2.80)***
0.1748
(4.56)***
0.0632
(2.05)**
Observations 1755 855 870 885 870 880 875
R-squared 0.3955 0.4774 0.3455 0.4276 0.4121 0.4472 0.3665
Robust t statistics in parentheses:
*significant at 10%;
**significant at 5%;
***significant at 1%.
Normalization over the entire data set.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017372.t002
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instructions of the experimenters, to avoid any perspective-taking
activity. Moreover, upon asking participants at the end of the
experiment, none of them affirmed to have consciously changed
her effort or strategy across different conditions. In the light of
these considerations, it is conceivable that the modulation of the
effort in response to different rewarding schemes was the
consequence of an automatic and unconscious mental process.
Therefore, the MCE of intrinsic motivations due to external
incentives, that ultimately determined the level of application and
diligence exerted by subjects (the safety margin factor), may arise
as an unconscious outcome outside a strategic context, even in
response to ‘‘weak’’ external incentives changes, such as a slightly
different way to deliver a given amount of money.
In Condition 1 the completion of each trial entailed an equal
reward assigned to both subjects. In this respect, the surplus
resulting from the cooperation was equally divided between
subjects. Following an economic terminology, in condition 1 the
benefit of cooperation was not excludable, in the sense that no
individual could be excluded from enjoying a slice of the surplus
generated by the coordinated efforts. In Condition 2 and 3
cooperation is still productive, but within trials only one
participant was rewarded. This character of excludability in
Conditions 2 and 3 introduced a substantial difference with respect
to Condition 1: reciprocity. In social psychology (as well as in
game theory) reciprocity means that people reward kind action
and punish unkind ones. In the present context reciprocity has
sustained in Conditions 2 and 3 an implicit agreement between
subjects, in the sense that results in Table 1 are consistent with the
statement: ‘‘I help you to win J1 if you help me to win J1’’.
However, the excludability of surplus between Conditions 2 and 3
is asymmetrical, since in Condition 2 it is the pushing subject that
it is rewarded, while in Condition 3 it is the opposing subject.
Actually, this asymmetry introduced roles within trials. Specifical-
ly, looking at the mechanics of the coordination, it is fairly clear
that if the opponent’s finger started moving before the other one
started pushing, the sphere would have been fallen in the wrong
container. Since the event of accidental drop of the sphere has
occurred in a negligible proportion, we can safely claim that the
subject opposite to the pushing one as not started to move before
the pushing subjects had started to push. Since, at each trial it was
the pushing subject that decided to start action, while the opposing
one waited for her couplemate’s decision, following the metaphors
of the game theory we attribute the role of leader to the pushing
subject and the role of follower to the opposing subject. Following
the metaphor outlined above, we can interpret our result in the
light that Conditions 1 and 2 share the feature that the leader is
rewarded, while Conditions 2 and 3 share the characteristic that
cooperation is sustained by reciprocity.
Our main results are that high social capital participants subjects
exhibited no significant reaction to the modulation of external
reward within conditions. In this respect, the intrinsic motivations
sustaining cooperation was not affected by removing the monetary
incentive of the leader (the pushing subject) in Condition 3. In this
sense, high social capital participants displayed strong reciprocity,
which caused them to be insensitive to changes in external
motivations. On the contrary, low social capital participants exerted
a significative lower effort in Condition 3 than in Condition 1, but
no difference in effort is detected between Conditions 1 and 2.
Following our line of interpretation, this sample of subjects actually
perceived a zero monetary incentive as they played as leader in
condition 3, causing a lower effort spent in the task. In this respect,
they actually responded to extrinsic motivation consistently with a
selfish-rationality argument. However, effort spent in condition 1
does not significantly differ from effort recorded in condition 2.
Thus, it seems that the non excludable character of surplus in
condition 1 did matter. In condition 1 whatever container did the
sphere have been dropped subjects were rewarded, thus reciprocity
was not relevant. In this sense, this group of this group of subjects
exhibited only weak reciprocity, since they showed some degree of
aversion to reciprocate unless they were externally rewarded.
In terms of motivational literature, the above discussion suggests
two final considerations. First, reciprocity appears a relevant
dimension of intrinsic motivations in social interaction, and, more
interestingly, the propensity to reciprocate depends on the stock of
social capital. Since the accumulation of social capital can be an
explicit policy target on the part of public institutions, our results
suggest a precise channel, micro-founded on the behaviour of the
single individual, through which investment in social capital might
display their effects. More specifically, only when individuals are
poorly endowed with social capital social interaction via market-
transactions (i.e. through external motivations incentives) is
effective. On the contrary, when individuals are integrated by high
levels of social capital, their behavior may react to changes in
relative prices in opposition to what is expected on the basis of a
standard economic argument. Second and more importantly, the
effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation does not rely
upon any explicit cost-benefit evaluation, stemming from a
controlled cognitive process, but may result automatically as an
unconscious outcome. This may reflect the specific monetary
character of the external motivation. It is a well established result
that several external stimuli may ‘‘prime’’ subjects, conditioning in
an uncontrolled way their behaviour [31,32,20]. A more recent
study, however, has showed the precise behaviour’s bias due to the
priming of money [33], which supports the interpretation of our
results. The main result of this study shows that ‘‘money brings
about a self-orientation, in which people prefer to be free of
dependency and dependents‘‘ (p. 1154). In this respect the
‘‘aversion for reciprocity’’ argument we used in the discussion
before may just be reversed by using a notion of ‘‘preference for the
self-supporting’’, which is exactly the consequence of the priming of
money according to Vohs et al. [33]. On the one side, our results
find additional supports from the subliminal effects of money
investigated in this study, on the other side they refine this evidence
since we show that the ‘‘priming’’ effect of money is modulated by
the social relevant experiences of individuals (social capital).
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